Shortly after the turn of the century, a state legislator from the Midwest declared that "if securities legislation was not passed, financial pirates would sell citizens everything in his state but the blue sky."' These financial pirates were engaged in t he widespread sale of "pieces of paper" representing ownership in various corporate enterprises, 2 many of which were valueless or nonexistent.' The rural states, "having a large proportion of agriculturists not versed in ordinary business methods," had become "hunt ing ground[s]"
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law,'" claiming that state blue sky laws had eliminated the need for national regulation."
Since enactment of federal securities legislation, their criticism has been directed at the dual regulatory system which emerged. The primary focus of this criticism is two fold:
( I) the absence of uniformity among the federal and state schemes makes compliance difficult and expensive, and (2) the federal and state schemes are needlessly duplicat ive. 28
The Securities Industry Association now complains that the dual regulatory system "has grown in duplication and burden to the point where the negative impact on the securities industry far outweighs the benefits to investors. -28 Indeed, the group now questions whether the states should have any role in the regulation of securities.'" It has called on the SEC to seek legislation to establish "a national uniform system of regulation -or, alternatively, "to preempt states from concurrent regulation.'"
This call for preemption" was voiced during recent hearings on Use need for unif'ortnity and coordination in state and federal securities laws,'" as mandated by Con- (September 9, 1983) . This letter was submitted in response to an SEC request for comments on effectuating increased uniformity in state and federal regulation of securities. Securities Act Release No. 6474 (July 22, 1983) "' The doctrine of preemption is premised on the supremacy clause of the Constitution which provides that state law must yield to federal law to the extent that they conflict. U.S. CONS-I. ., art. VI, § 2. Courts and commentators have recognized four contexts in which state law will be deemed preempted by federal law: 1) Congress expressly prohibited stare legislation in the field. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S.
218,234 (1947):
2) Congress implied/' prohibited state legislation because the pervasiveness of the federal scheme Makes state law incompatible. Fidelity Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982); 3) compliance with both state and federal law is impossible. Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 -43 (1963) ; 4) slate law frust rates the purposes and object ives of the federal law. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 540-41 (1977) .
See generally Note, A Framework fir Preemption Analysis, 88 VALE t..J. 363 (1978) . ''" See 15 Sec. REG. & L. REP. (I3NA) No. 40, p. 1924 (October 14, 1983 ):
34 Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275 (1980 . [Vol. 25:495 however, should tint he hailed as an harbinger of ultimate I riumph over state securities reg. it Lakin .
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
In MITE, the Court held that an Illinois statute which sought to regulate interstate corporate takeovers' violated the commerce clause of t he Constitution." Although the Court's holding was limited to t he commerce clause issue, three of the justices opined that the statute also should fall due to its preemption by the Williams Act.' Because the Illinois law applied to interstate purchases of securities," i he plurality's position in MITE has served to mobilize forces already encouraged by recent political emphasis on deregulation at the federal level. 42 Furthermore, lower courts have interpreted the MITE decision broadly, applying it to a variety of state takeover statutes,' an unfair competition provision," and a state blue sky law.' The Supreme Court's opinion in MITE, however, a 11.1.. ANN. STAT. ch . 1211/2, 1,; 11 137.51-.70 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983 .
'9 457 U.S. at 645.
4"
Id. at 634-39. " hr.. ANN. STAT. di. 121 t /2. , ¶ 137,52-9 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983 ) (takeover offer is an offer to acquire or the acquisition of' any equity security of a target company pursuant to a tender offer).
4'2 Interview With Michael Unger, Director, Massachusetts Securities Division (September 18, 1983 There is an increasing number of individuals and organizations openly critical of the existing system. Proposals are being made that would result in outright or the facto preemption ...
... Accordingly, it is imperative that we intensify our efforts to achieve a level of uniformity and coordination that will forestall momentum to preempt state securities laws. Id. " See Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Service Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1983 ) (Oklahoma statute violates commerce clause); Telvest v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983 ) (Virginia statute limited to domestic companies violates commerce clause); Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982 " See Conkling v. Moseley. Hallgarten, Estabrook, & Weeden, Inc. 575 F. Supp. 760 (1983) . ln this case, a group of securities customers brought an action against a stock brokerage house alleging that the brokers overtraded their accounts. Id. at 760-61. The plaintiffs claimed that the broker's actions were violative of a Massachusetts statute prohibiting unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Id.
The court disagreed, stating that "federal law has largely superseded state regulation of securities transactions" and that "securities transactions traditionally have been subject to federal control." . In support of these propositions, the court cited MITE and then stated that the Supreme Court's decision held that "a state law regulating securities transactions was unconstitutional under the commerce clause." Id. The court's reasoning led it to the conclusion that the Massachusetts fair trade practices statute did not extend to transactions involving securities. Id. at. 762 . It is clear that the Supreme Court in MITE did not intend that its decision be employed to prevent state law from being used to seek redress against fraudulent or dishonest broker-dealers. This application of the MITE decision contravenes the broad remedial purposes of the federal securities acts. See 15 U.S.C. § § 77 p and 78bb(a) (1976 ( & Supp. 1982 
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expressly confirmed the constitutional validity of state securities regulation generally, pointing specifically to a trilogy of its decisions commonly referred to as the Blue Sky Cases" and to the savings clauses in the 1933 ' and 1934" Acts." This article first addresses the judicial, congressional and executive recognition that has been extended to the states in the field of securities regulation. The Supreme Court, both prior and subsequent to the development of the dual system, has affirmed the validity of state securities regulation. 5° In passing federal securities legislation, Congress acted primarily to fill regulatory gaps which the states could not fill because of jurisdictional limits on their authority:" The executive branch during recent administrations has implemented deregulatory policies in numerous areas of business regulation." This trend has been particularly apparent in the field of securities regulation, where budget allocations have been restricted and a greater role for the states encouraged.'" After reviewing these sources of support for state regulation, a response is made to the claim that duplication and the absence of uniformity have undermined the advantages, if any, of the dual regulatory system. In addressing this criticism, the different regulatory philosophies of the state and federal regulatory schemes and the resulting benefits to investors are explored. This article concludes that the complementary policies inherent. its the present. system establish a persuasive case against preemption of slate securities laws.
JUDICIAL RECOC,NMON OF STATE SECURITIES REGuLATioN
The Supreme Court has consistently affirmed the validity of state securities laws during a period spanning seven decades. The respect accorded by the Court to state blue sky laws began with the Blue Sky Cases in 1917, when constitutional assaults were leveled at the laws then in effect in the states of Ohio, South Dakota and Michigan." Since enactment of the federal securities scheme, these cases have served as a reference point for the (application of New York antifraud provision to transactions involving corporate takeovers not unconstitutional as statute did not purport to regulate the takeover process and was protected by savings clause).
" Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917) .
" 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1976) . " 15 U.S.C. § 7Shb(a) (Supp. 1982) . " 457 U.S. at 631 and 641. 5 ' See, e.g., Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973) (Congress did not adopt a regulatory system apart from and exclusive of state regulation of securities); SEC v. Nat'l Sec., lnc" 393 U.S. 453 (1969) (state regulation may co-exist with federal securities laws); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917) ." The Ohio statute provided that an application must be filed with the state commissioner containing the following information:
(a) The names and addresses of the directors and officers if' such applicant be a corporation or association, and of all partners if it be a partnership, and of the person if the applicant be an individual, together with names and addresses of all agents of such applicant assisting in the disposal of such securities; (I)) Location of the applicant's principal office and of his principal office in the state, if any (c) The general plan and character of the business of said applicant, together with references which die 'commissioner' shall confirm by such investigation as he may deem necessary, establishing the good repute in business °knelt applicati o n, directors, officers, partners, and agents. If the applicant he a corporation organized under the laws of any other state, territory, or govern men t, or have its principal place of business therein, it shall also file a copy of its articles of incorporation, certified by the proper officer of such state, territory, or government, and of its regulations ;and by-laws; and if it be an unincorporated association, a certified copy of its articles of association, or deed of settlement. flall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. at 549-50. 
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In challenging these provisions, the parties contended that this aspect of the Ohio law conferred arbitrary power upon the state commissioner, and thus violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; 62 that the separate classifications, and, hence, different treatment. of certain securities violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendrnent.; 6" and that the entire licensing scheme imposed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. 64
The Supreme Court framed the issue in Hall as "an asserted conflict between national power and state power, and [the] power of the state as limited or forbidden by the National Constitution."'3 The Court agreed with the state's contention that the regulatory scheme adopted by Ohio was a valid exercise of the state's police power, that power being "the least. limitable of the exercises of government." t' 6 Reemphasizing the power of the states to prevent. frauds," the Court. proceeded to determine whether the manner in which the state sought to achieve this goal was constitutionally permissible.
The Court rejected contentions that the statute violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution and then focused on whether the Ohio statute violated the commerce clause."' Although the Court noted the absence of federal legislation in the field, thereby pretermitting any preemption issues under the supremacy A state may direct its law against what it deems the evil as it actually exists without covering the whole field of possible abuses, and it may do so none the less that the forbidden act does not differ in kind from those that are allowed.
Id.
It is interesting to note that the Court in Edgar v. MITE Corp. used the Illinois statute's issuer exemption to rebut the state's argument that the Illinois statute protected investors from fraudulent or unfair tender offers. 457 U.S. at 644. The Court did not explore the reasons for the exemption or explain why classifications of certain securities or transactions as exempt could he used to determine that a valid state interest was absent.
" Iri. at 557. " Id. at 548. 86 Id.
" at 552. The Court stated: We have lately decided ... the principle of the power of the state to prevent frauds and impositions ... [citation omitted]. The principle applies as well to securities as to material products [The] integrity of the securities can only be assured by the probity of the dealers in them and the information which is given of them. This assurance the state has deemed necessary for its welfare to require; and the requirement is not unreasonable or inappropriate. It extends to the general market something of the safeguards that are given to trading [on the National Exchanges] -safeguards that experience has adopted as advantageous. Inconvenience may be caused and supervision and surveillance, but this must yield to the public welfare. In concluding that the regulation was a valid exercise of the state's police power, the Supreme Court observed that while "every new regulation of business or conduct meets challenge,"" it is within the province of the states to make the varying policy judgments (which twenty-seven states at that time had done) in determining that the business of dealing in securities must have adequate supervision."' Although the Blue Sky Cases were decided prior to federal intervention in the securities field, they have been used following enactment of the 1933 and 1934 Acts to affirm (1982) . While regulatory provisions in those states imposing merit regulation vary, the most common involve a substantive review of underwriting commissions, offering expenses, offering price, promoters' investment, dilution, cheap stock, debt and interest coverage, voting rights, and options and warrant s. Id REV. 147, 149-51 (1978) .
Merit regulation, subject to enduring criticism as unduly paternalistic, is based on the regulatory philosophy that the disclosure approach to securities regulation does not adequately protect investors. See Tyler, supra, at 904. Congress, in opting for the disclosure approach in its enactment of the federal securities law, was reluctant to intrude "into a phase that [was] holders a private right of action against corporate directors."' The Court set forth a four-prong test to determine whether a private remedy could be implied from a federal statute, where not expressly provided by Congress.'°4 Under this test, a court must consider the following questions: ( I) is the plaintiff a member of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted; (2) are there any indications of legislative intent to 96 Id. at 653.
Blue sky laws are a well recognized exercise of the police power of the states. The wiles of the salesman had been many; the devices to avoid state regulation had been clever and calculated" " Instrumentalities of interstate and foreign commerce were extensively employed by those beyond the reach of a state to sell securities to its citizens.... The Securities Act of 1933... was passed to fill a gap. " See e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT (MBCA) § § 15-20, 23-26, 31-34 (1979 the Court was equally reluctant to "federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities."'" The complainants, minority shareholders of a Delaware corporation, sought to set aside a short-form merger on the grounds that they did not receive notice of the merger and t hat the merger was effected for the sole purpose of freezing out minority shareholders."° Alt hough Delaware law provided minority shareholders with an appraisal remedy,"' the complainants attempted to bypass state law and seek recovery under I he 1934 Act."' Applying the test established in Cart v. Ash, the Supreme Court determined that rule 1013-5, 1 " a broad antifraud provision in the 1934 Act, did not create a private right of action for breach of corporate fiduciary duties.'" Although the Court noted that even if the language of the federal statute were not sufficiently clear to preclude implying a private right of action, it refused to imply one." 5 The Court refused to interfere with '4 Id. at 69. 157 Id. at 85. The Court observed that "corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation." Id. at 84. See also Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) , in which the Court not only refused to undermine state law governing the authority of directors to discontinue derivative suits (application of "business judgment rule"), but also held that federal courts must apply state law to the extent that it is consistent with the policies underlying the Investment Company Act and the investment Advisors Act. Id. at 478.
430 U.S. 462 (1977).
w9 Id. at 479.
Id. at 467. Under the Delaware short-form merger statute, a parent company owning at least 90% of the stock of a subsidiary can effect a merger with the subsidiary upon approval of the parent company's board of directors. Advance notice to the minority shareholders of the subsidiary is not required and any dissatisfied shareholder may petition a state court to obtain payment of the fair value of his shares as determined by a court appointed appraiser. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8 § 253, 262 (1983) . The Supreme Court noted that some states require a "valid business purpose" for the elimination of the minority interest through a short-form merger while others do not. 335 (1979) . "0 457 U. S. 624 (1982) . 1 " A tender offer is "a public offer or solicitation by a company, an individual or a group of persons to purchase during a fixed period of time all or a portion of a class or classes of securities of a publicly held corporation at a specified price or upon specified terms for cash and for securities." E. 70 (1973) .
ARANOW, H. EINHORN & C. BERLSTEIN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
1 " 457 U.S. at 627. 121 1976 & Supp..V 1981 . The Williams Act amended the 1934 Act to provide for comprehensive federal regulation of corporate tender offers. Its primary purpose was to protect the shareholders of a target company by requiring disclosures pertaining to the background and plans of the offeror and other information related to the tender offer. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc" 430 U.S. 1, 22-32 (1977 CON'rROL (1973) .
123 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch . 121 1 /2 1111 137.51-.70 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983 (repealed 1983) . The 111inoi.s statute, similar to the business takeover statutes enacted in 36 other slates, differed from the Williams Act in many respects. The extreme deviations, however, were found in the provisions which required that: (I) tender offers could not be effected until 20 clays after a filing was made with the Illinois Secretary of State; Id. at 137.54E, and (2) the Secretary must instigate a hearing on the merits of the tender offer if (a) he considered it necessary for the protection of the Illinois shareholders of the target company; Id. at ¶ 137.57E, or (b) one was requested by a majority of the outside directors of the target company; or (c) one was requested by Illinois residents who 510 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:495 the shares of a target company be registered with the Illinois Secretary of State.' 24 The statute broadly defined the term "target company" to bring within its ambit any corporation of which Illinois shareholders owned ten percent of its equity securities subject to the tender offer, as well as any corporation who met any two of the following criteria: ( I) a corporation with its principal executive offices in Illinois, (2) 137,' 142 (1970) . Under that test, a state statute will survive a commerce clause challenge if the local interests served by the statute outweigh the indirect burden imposed on interstate commerce. Id.
Justice White was also successful in securing a majority as to the portion of his opinion which held t hat MITE Corporation's withdrawal of the tender offer did not render the case moot. Id. at 630.
1 '' id. at 644. "4 Id. Only 27% of the target company's shareholders were Illinois residents. Id. at 642. Furthermore, Justice White noted in another part of his opinion (not adopted by the majority) that because the Illinois statute applied to offers for the stock of companies maintaining their principal place of business in Illinois, or 10% of its stated capital and paid-in surplus within the state, the Act could apply to a tender offer which would not affect a single Illinois shareholder. Id.
"5 The internal affairs doctrine is a choice of law rule which provides generally that the law of the state of incorporation governs the internal affairs of a corporation, regardless of where a lawsuit is brought. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S. 186 (1977) . In an effOrt to protect its citizens, however, a state may apply sonic or all of its own corporate law rules to corporations which are incorporated elsewhere if the corporation has substantial contacts with the state. See Western Airlines, loc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App.2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961) (July 15, 1983) . Moreover, the committee recommended that state corporation law be preempted "to the extent necessary to eliminate abuses or interference with , . . federal takeover regulation." Id. at 18 (Recommendation 9(a)).
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CONGRESSIONAL RECOGNITION , OF STATE SECURITIES REGULATION
Congress created the system of dual regulation of securities by enacting federal securities legislation over fifty years ago. It deliberately preserved for investors the protections afforded by state securities laws by adding savings clauses to its securities statutes.'" In addition, Congress exempted from its scheme various types of securities and securities transactions, leaving regulation of these matters primarily to the states.' 54 It demonstrated its continuing support for protection at the local level of government by establishing a blue sky taw for the District of Columbia thirty years later. 155 More recently, Congress has encouraged greater coordination of the state and federal participants in the dual system, disclaiming any desire to preempt state laws.'" These legislative developments demonstrate Congress' high regard for the working partnership between state and federal governments in the regulation of securities.
When Congress adopted the 1933 Act, each state except Nevada had enacted blue sky laws'" under its assumed responsibility to protect its citizens from wide-ranging fraud and abuse at the hands of unregulated promoters, issuers and broker-dealers. By requiring disclosures in connection with securities offerings, the blue sky taws prevented the sale of millions of shares of worthless stock. 158 These laws provided significantly more protection to investors than had public and private actions based on state common law remedies for deceit.'" This success, however, led unscrupulous promoters to develop schemes to 157 Securities Act Hearings, supra note 2, at 94.
1 " See supra note 8.
'" The action of deceit, one of several torts falling within the common law of misrepresentation, generally requires proof by clear and convincing evidence of five essential elements, including (1) a false representation, (2) made with knowledge of its falsity or without sufficient basis in fact ("scienter"), (3) with an intent to induce action or inaction, (4) upon which a party justifiably relies, and (5) to his resulting damage or injury. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 100 (4th ed. 1971) . Assuming that a defrauded investor could marshal sufficient evidence, usually only circumstantial in nature, to prove each of these elements, several obstacles would remain which could frustrate a recovery of the lost funds. First, he had to utilize his then depleted resources to finance the litigation, and, second, he was faced with the frequently insurmountable difficulty of locating the perpetrator after the fact and obtaining jurisdiction over him. Cf. Securilies Act Hearings,supra note 2, at 101 (Dept. of Commerce Study of the Economic and Legal Aspects of the Proposed Federal Securities Act) (sellers using means of interstate commerce and never entering state cannot be said to have "fled" from the state, precluding state jurisdiction over 'him). If these burdens could be overcome, the defrauded investor may have achieved only a pyrrhic victory -the securities swindler usually had disposed of or concealed the invested funds and had no other discoverable assets available to satisfy a judgment. Moreover, many victims were willing to forego prosecution if the dealers agreed to refund a portion of the investor's money. Id. at 100. Fraudulent promoters often set aside a percentage of the funds in order to placate their more powerful investors. Id. The blue sky laws, in addition to providing general supervision of those engaged in the securities business, were intended to prevent the fraudulent activity at its inception, to "nip it in the bud" before the losses were sustained, through registration, disclosure and merit review. L. Loss & E.
COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 21-39 (1958) . They were to protect the investing public generally, "with provisions which were preventive rather than remedial." id. at 21. See also PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 22 (1970) . In response to the 1921 enactment of a registration-free fraud law in New York, "one incredulous" attorney general, cognizant of the basic defect in fraud laws, remarked: "Just how [we are] to discover in advance who is going to perpetrate fraud is not made clear in the act." Id. effort to obtain redress from sellers of securities operating in other states.'" As a result, state securities administrators joined in the call for federal legislation to complement their efforts at the state level, expressing "the need of federal assistance in their campaign against the deluge of fraudulent securities that had been flooding the country. "154 It was against this background that the "gap" was filled by the 1933 Act,'" underscoring not only the symbiotic duality of state and federal securities regulation, but also the interstitial nature of congressional power exercised under the commerce clause of the Constitution.'" In passing the 1933 Act, as well as the other federal securities statutes,'" Congress was careful to preserve, not preempt state blue sky laws,'" which not only Federal law is generally interstitial in its nature. It rarely occupies a legal field completely, totally excluding all participation by the legal systems of the states. This was plainly true in the beginning when the federal legislative product (including the Constitution) was ext remely small. 11 is significantly true today, despite the volume of Congressional enactments, and even within areas where Congress has been very active. Federal legislation, on the whole, has been conceived and drafted on an ad hoc basis to accomplish limited objectives. It builds upon legal relationships established by the states, altering or supplanting them only so far as necessary for the special purpose. Congress acts, in short, against the background of the total corpus juris of the states in much the way that a state legislature acts against the background of the common law, assumed to govern unless changed by legislation.
Id. at 470-71.
See also Kaminsky v. Abrams, 281 F. Supp. 501, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (federal securities laws are incomplete and interstitial, superseding state corporation law only when there is a direct conflict). Cf. Arkansas Elec. Coop. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, U.S. 103 S. Ct. 1905 Ct. (1983 (REA applicable within the "constraints" of existing state regulatory schemes).
antedated the federal legislation, but were generally broader in scope.'" The initial bill which passed the House contained a provision making it a federal crime to transmit or offer in interstate commerce securities that failed to comply with the laws of any state where they were to be sold."0 This provision was intended in part "to assure the states that [the 1933 Act] was not an attempt to supplant their laws, but an attempt to supplement their laws and to assist them in enforcing their laws in those cases where they have no control.. This provision was questioned, however, because it worked a federalization of present and future laws enacted by state legislatures over which Congress had no corm-01.' 72 Although the purpose of this provision was to "complement ... amplify or assist"' the states, it was eliminated by Senate amendment and, ultimately, by the conference committee.''" The House and Senate conferees presumably were satisfied that state interests were protected adequately by another provision in the bill, a savings clause, designed to preserve control of securities at the state level: It chose to regulate securities transactions primarily through the vehicle of full disclosure." The statute requires a statutory prospectus,'" as part. of a registration statement,'" to be filed with the SEC in advance of any securities offering.' The prospectus must be delivered to investors prior to or at. the time of any sale.'" Although t he prospectus must. state all material' facts pertaining to the offering," the 1933 Act. does not require the securities offered for sale to he a "fair, just or equitable" investment or otherwise to comply with any qualitative standards. In drafting the 1933 Act., Congress refused to give the SEC any power to pass upon the merits of any offering of securities," but only required that essential facts be disclosed.' 88 In exercising t his restraint, Congress apparently was aware that "merit. regulation" was central to the protective schemes afforded by most of the states' 89 and was understandably cautious to avoid any assumpin full." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 243 (1978) . The purpose of the rule is lei prevent Congress "from resorting to ambiguity as a cloak for its failure to accommodate the competing interests bearing on the federal-state balance." Id. at 294, ' 17' The existence of a savings clause "restrict is] the sphere of judicial injuiry." Note,.t Framework /or Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363, 366 (1978) . 'the courts cannot find that Congress expressly or impliedly preempted the field. See Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 182 n. 13 (1979) . However, a savings clause will not prevent a court from finding preemption if she state law conflicts with or frustrates the purposes and objectives of the federal regulatory scheme. See Edgar v, MITE, Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 631 (1982) . But see Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202, 209 (1944) ("where the government has provided for collaboration the courts should not find conflict").
17 " See supra note 177. 1 " H.R. REP. No. 85, 7344 Cong., Ist Ses.s. 3 (1933) . Congress, in enacting the 1933 Act, followed the approach of the B ritish Companies Act, which, since 1844, had compelled disclosure t hrough the registration of securities offerings. See Securities Act Hearings ,supra note 2, at 108 (Dept. of Commerce Study of she Economic and Legal Aspects of the Proposed Federal Securities Act) and L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 3, 35-36 (1983) .
i" 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1976).
182 Id. at § 778(8) . Section 5 of the 1933 Act makes it unlawful for any person to engage in the interstate offer or sale of securities unless a registration statement is in effect. Id. at § 77e.
" Id. at 77f(a) (1976).
1 " 15 U.S.C. § 77e(h)(2) (1976). 1 " The term "material" has been defined by the SEC in rule 905. 17 C.F.R. § 230. 405 (1983) . See also TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 938, 445-50 (1976) .
'" 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b) (1976).
187 Id. at § 77w (1976) . cf. 15 U.S.C. § 79z-2 (1976) (unlawful to represent that public utility company securities are recommended by any federal agency).
"" See supra note 110.
1 " See Securities Act Hearings,supra note 2, at 53. During the hearings on t he 1933 Act, Congress considered the issue of whether a disclosure oriented scheme, unsupplemented by merit review, would provide sufficient protection to investors. Id. One Congressman was concerned that disclosure requirements alone would, in effect, "lock the stable door after the horse has been stolen," Id. at 52. The answer given was that the theory upon which the 1933 Act was based was "not to prevent the issuance of worthless stock, but merely to give such facts as will enable a purchaser to recognize it as worthless stock." Id. at 53. Although it was acknowledged that Congress could go further, to do so would have been "getting over into a phase that is covered by the state blue sky laws." M.
May 1984]
DUAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES
519
tions by investors that SEC review worked "a guarantee or approval of any particular securities issue."'" if investors were to be protected from securities deals which had no economic substance, were unreasonably speculative or simply unfair, they were told, in effect, to look to the states, not the federal government, for any such protection. Accordingly, t he states have continued to afford such protection, largely through a combination of disclosure and fairness requirements.'' Congress further demonstrated its lack of intent to preempt state securities laws by the exemptive scheme it included in the 1933 Act. Congress specifically exempted from the federal registration provisions numerous types of securities and securities transactions which, in it s view, did not demand investor protection at the federal level by means of any formal disclosure and SEC review prior to issuance. These exemptions include, among others, state and local government securities, 192 certain state financial institution securities,'" insurance policies and annuity contracts issued by corporations subject to state supervision,'" all intrastate offerings of securities, 19' certain offerings of small amounts (now $5,000,000 or less) or of a limited character where the SEC deems federal protection unnecessary 1 " and private placements of securities.' Accordingly, the burden of preissuance investor protection through registration provisions was posited solely with the states, most significantly in those transactions falling within the intrastate, small offering and private placement exemptions.'" The exclusion of these various types of securities transactions from the scope of the 1933 Act did not imply in any sense that protection was not needed at the state level, indeed, the opposite conclusion may be reached. As one blue sky law specialist observed, perhaps the greatest measure of protection [for the residents of the respective states] is warranted in the case of such securities or transactions."'" 1 ' H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1933) . See also, 15 U.S.C. § 77w (1976) which provides:
Neither the fact that the registration statement for a security has been filed or is in effect nor the fact that a stop order is not in effect with respect thereto shall he deemed a finding by the Commission that the registration statement is true and accurate on its face or that it does not contain an untrue statement of fact or omit to state a material fact, or be held to mean that the Commission has in any way passed upon the merits of, or given approval to, such security. It shall be unlawful to make, or cause to be made to any prospective purchaser any representation contrary to the foregoing provisions of this section. Securities regulation at the state level was fostered not only by congressional delimitation of the 1933 Act, but also by Congress' specific enlistment of state assistance in enforcing and supplementing the federal scheme. Congress added another savings clause at Section 16 of the 1933 Act, 20° which provides that the federal rights and remedies set forth its the statute are "in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity."'°' These other "rights and remedies" clearly include those provided by the corporation laws, blue sky laws and the common law of each of the states. 2°' Congress also granted jurisdiction to state courts, concurrent with federal district courts, over all suits at law or in equity, to enforce all duties and liabilities arising under the 1933 Act:201 In preserving the remedies provided by the states and the jurisdiction of their courts, Congress furthered "the broad remedial purposes" of its securities laws. 204 Consequently, the protections afforded investors at the state level formed an integral part of a dual system of securities regulation. S. 18(1, 195 (1963) .
'''" 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1976 CI. 683, 687 (1983) . See also SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963) (Congress codified the common law action for fraud "remedially," and not technically as it had traditionally been applied in arms length transactions involving land or ordinary chattels). 200 15 U.S.C. 78bb(a) (Supp. 1982) . 21 " Id. While the purpose of the 1933 Act was to regulate distributions of securities, the purpose of the 1934 Act was to regulate post-distribution trading of securities. Its primary regulatory themes were: (1) the requirement of continuous disclosure by publicly held companies, periodically and in connection with proxy solicitations and tender offers; (2) the regulation of the exchange and over-the-counter markets; (3) the prevention of fraud and market manipulation; and (4) Indulging the fair presumption that Congress intended ... to accomplish something, its intention must have been that neither act should have the effect of withdrawing from the states their jurisdiction over transactions in securities.... The states may, therefore, to the extent possible before the enactment of the federal acts, legislate in this field subject only to the usual qualification that in the event of any actual incompatibility between a federal and state regulation, the former shall prevail.
Id. (7) 
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securities to protect investors from fraud and abuse requires local, as well as national, corn ro1, 323
The "last word" from Congress on the dual system of securities regulation was expressed in the Small Business Investment incentive Act of 19800" After acknowledging a significant reduction in the flow of capital to small business during the preceding decade, Congress conducted extensive hearings to determine and alleviate I he most significant impediments to capital formation.'" Notwithstanding its conclusion that the slow-clown was the product of many economic forces apart from government regula- Swoon, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) , that the anti-waiver provisions in the federal securities acts were not subject to the Federal Arbitration Act, the court in Front; refused to extend the exception to state anti-waiver provisions, hi. It held that a "lateral balance of diametrically opposed federal policies , would [not] be applied vertically to restrict the Arbitration Act's impact on conflicting state procedure." Id.
If the Court in koog had been made aware of the Levin decision, it is unlikely that they could have reached the same conclusion. Whether an anti-waiver provision is part of the federal securities acts or a stale blue sky law, Congressional intent to protect investors should not be undermined solely because that intent is reiterated in a state blue sky law.
Recently, the SEC adopted rule 15c2-2, which prohibits broker-dealers from including predispute arbitration clauses in their customer agreements. 17 C.F. R. 240.15c2-2 (1984 
.
"z Id. at. 12. Other factors identified by Congress as contributing to the difficulty experienced by small business included general economic conditions, existing tax structure, and capital gains tax. hi. [Vol. 25:495 liberalize its exempt ive scheme, 2" and, importantly, to impose a mandate on the SEC to cooperate more fully with the states in the regulation of securities matters. 2"3 This mandate, set. forth in section 19(c) of the 1933 Act,'" is premised on a declaration of policy requiring greater federal and state cooperation and maximizing the effectiveness and uniformity of regulatory standards, while minimizing interference and reducing regulatory costs incident to capital formation. 237 The statute specifically requires cooperation between the SEC and any association of state securities officials 238 in sharing information regarding state registration or exemptions of securities, developing uniform forms and procedures, and developing a uniform small issuer exemption. 239 Congressional deference to the regulatory role of the states and the dual system of securities regulation also was evidenced by language in the Act which provides the SEC with authority to adopt any uniform small issuer exemption "which can be agreed upon among several stales or between the states and the federal government.""" Congress' "last word" on the dual system of securities regulation was even more specific than the savings clauses originally enacted: "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing preemption of stale law. 
III. EXECUTIVE RECOGNITION OF STATE SECURITIES REGULATION
The dual system of securities regulation has remained stable despite the changes in economic regulatory policies which have occurred in the transition of successive Presidents. The regulatory policies proposed and implemented by the President, however, do have a profound effect on the regulatory balance between state and federal schemes which address similar areas of concern." When the President adopts a deregulatory approach to business regulation at the federal level, any resulting gaps in regulatory protection must be filled, if at all, by the states. In recent years, a succession of Presidents has adopted deregulatory policies, calling for a retreat or total withdrawal of the federal government from various fields of business regulation.'" The current Administration, in applying its deregulatory policy to federal securities regulation, has encouraged a correspondingly greater role for the states." Its "regulatory reforms" result not only in a reduced risk of preemptive conflict,' but also underkore the role of state blue sky laws in assuring continuity in investor protection.
The Administration of President. Reagan has furthered considerably a recent trend toward deregulation of business at the federal level of government.'" Prior to commencement of his term, President Reagan appointed a transition team to review the operations of the SEC and to develop recommendations to effectuate his "deregulatory policy objectives."" The transition team recommended a significant and far-reaching diminution of the federal role in the dual regulatory system. 20 It urged a thirty percent No. 40, p. 1924 (October 14, 1983 . Recently, they have issued a report regarding implementation of these plans, which sets forth their respective agreements. See 16 SEC. K-25 (January 21, 1981) . "Emerging state securities activity coupled with federal deregulation makes helpful a full appreciation and understanding of the relationship of state securities laws to the federal Acts. The President should encourage the SEC to coordinate and cooperate with state securities regulatory authorities." Id. Cf. Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 YALE L.J. 931, 954 (1960) . This commentator, although not addressing the effect of regulatory policies on the balance between state-federal schemes, observed that:
Although Congress exercises a legislative oversight over the regulatory agencies, [it] . is often concerned with specific ... problems and not with substantive policy. Because of its ... diverse responsibilities, the machinery of Congress is not adapted to day-byclay detailed policy coordination. The only possible source of detailed coordination of economic regulatory policy is the Executive. REFORM 6-9 (1981) . The Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations took active roles in the deregulation of the airline, telecommunications, trucking, and oil and gas industries, among others. Id. See also Nerenberg, Regulatory Reform in a Nutshell, 62 A.B.A.J. 121 (1976) . 244 Although "[f]ederal regulations have no less preemptive effect than federal statutes," Fidelity Federal Say. Sc Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) , their repeal or dilution as a result of deregulation reduces the risk of conflict with similar state regulations. In other words, a federal scheme which has been weakened significantly through modified provisions and reduced appropriations is less likely to be "so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room to supplement it." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) . employees, be converted into merely a "think tank," with fifty employees, devoted to "regulatory reforms which might deregulate the securities industry." 2" The team further proposed that the SEC Enforcement Division be decentralized with a staff reduction of its Washington office from 200 to 50 employees. 252 In addition, the Enforcement Division was to limit its focus to "major cases" and to eliminate its frequent use of consent injunctions and public disclosure of investigations. 253 Similarly, the transition team recommended that the Division of' Corporation Finance limit its role to a five percent "spot-check" of periodic filings and proxy statements, with only a "sampling" review of initial registration statements. 254 Instead of providing review of required disclosures in documents filed with the SEC, its function would be limited to that of a central public repository Of filings. 2" The transition team expressly disclaimed the notion that its deregulatory efforts were based on a "make-do-with-less" philosophy, 258 and emphasized that the proposed metamorphosis of the SEC could be accomplished without harm to the agency's statutory mandate.' Nevertheless, the report the transition team developed on behalf of the Reagan Administration indicates a policy of "make-do-with-more" state regulation, a policy totally inconsistent with the position that state securities regulation should be preempted. The Reagan Administration policy of federal deregulation, as enunciated by the transition team in its report, clearly was not intended to establish a vacuum in the field of securities regulation. A significant part of the report was devoted to the relationship between the SEC and state securities regulators, concluding that "enhancement of the state authority is a desirable goal and could permit some phasing down of the federal role at some future time.'" The report not only urged further coordination and cooperation at the two levels, but also urged that state administrators be appointed to the SEC, as well as others with an appreciation of the federal-state relationship in the field, because of the importance of "emerging state securities activities coupled with federal deregulation." 259 The report concluded that policy statements regarding federal deregulation generally should emphasize the responsibilities of state authority in those regulatory areas affected:26'i Consistently emphasizing a corresponding expansion of state regulation, the transition team developed, in effect, an equation of continuity. In other words, the recommended reduction of power vested in the SEC would increase the states' power to regulate in the securities field.
Id.
See L. WEISS & M. KLAUSS, CASE STUDIES IN REGULATION' REVOLUTION AND
2 " Id. at K-1. " 252 Id. at K-7 to K-9. The report noted that the SEC had been criticized for settlement of major cases by permitting defendants deserving harsher penalties to "consent" to permanent injunctions against unlawful conduct. Id. at K-8.
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The Reagan Administration has pursued vigorously its efforts to implement the deregulatory policies announced in its transition learn report.' Although the budgetary reductions recommended have not been achieved, it is instructive to note t he , results thus far. The report indicated that the authorized and approved budget estimates for fiscal years 1981, 1982, and 1983 were, respectively, $85,500,000, $98,000,000 and $108,000,000, and recommended corresponding reductions to $71,000,000, $60,000,000, and $53,000,000. 262 The actual appropriations for the SEC during those fiscal years have been $80,200,000 for 1981,263 $83,300,000 for 1982, 264 and $88,000,000 for 1983. 2" The SEC's current Chairman has supported fully these budgetary reductions, causing one congressman to remark that the SEC is now undergoing "deregulation by attrition." 266 Deregulation at the federal level obviously has placed an increased regulatory burden on the slates at a time when critics of their role in the dual system are holding "preemption". over their heads. 2"
IV. A RESPONSE TO THE CRITICISM OF STATE SECURITIES REGULATION
State blue sky laws have been criticized most ()hen as needlessly duplicative of the federal scheme and unduly burdensome because they lack uniformity.'" Although judicial precedent, congressional action and executive implementation frequently are ignored when assaults are leveled at stale regulation, these factors are critical to an understanding of the federal-state relationship in the regulation of securities. The background developed by the preceding sections of this article provides the essential context for this response to the major criticisms of state securities regulation.
A. Dup/ication
Central to the issue of duplication is the question why there should be one set of securities laws at the federal level and another set in each of t he states. This basic issue REV. 899 (1982) safeguard their interest indeed, the blue sky laws were among the earliest consumer protection statutes.`"" These laws, like most legislative decisions, generally take the form of a compromise between the competing interests of industry representatives and consumers. When such laws are administered arbitrarily or require reform, businessmen, particularly those engaged in the issue or sale of securities, have not been hesitant in their efforts to effect legislative revisions. 2" In the securities field, these compromises have involved a balancing of the legitimate interests of business in the facilitation of capital formation against the interests of investors requiring protection. Many states now recognize that certain classes of investors do not require pre-issuance protection, and, accordingly, permit them to conduct their own qualitative review. 288 The accommodation of these competing interests at the local level is the genius of pluralism.
In addition to differences in regulatory scope and philosophy, state regulation performs vital functions which have not been and probably cannot be accomplished by a federal agency. For example, the state securities commission serves as the complaint bureau for its resident investors -persons who simply could not achieve satisfaction from a telephone call, or series of calls, to a switchboard in Washington or at one of the SEC's scattered regional offices. 289 The state securities commission is not only more accessible, but also more visible to local investors as the agency charged with their protection. 299 It is able to respond to local concerns more rapidly and effectively than a centralized Washington bureaucracy. Probably the most plausible explanation for this accessibility is:
The slate regulators have a higher regard for the small investor, perhaps because he is a voter who reaches local legislators and administrators more easily than congressmen or federal commissioners, or perhaps because the localized nature of the activity makes it easier for the state administrator to As indicated by the common law, from time immemorial, persons with funds to invest were considered capable of determining the soundness of business ventures but recent developments in the field of business have been so rapid and so gigantic that even persons trained in one field are incapable of determining values in a related business. Even trained accountants are unable to determine, without detailed investigation, the intrinsic value of securities of corporations whose property and activities extend into many states and foreign countries. A responsive agency is essential to investor confidence, and consequently, investor participation in our capital markets. Access to a protective authority is especially critical to the small investor, the plateosaurus of the securities industry,' 292 whose protection rests largely with state securities regulators.'" Furthermore, each state securities commission serves as an information bank for investors, businessmen and lawyers. The state administrator compiles information from numerous sources, including filings made by issuers and broker-dealers, complaints from investors, investigative reports and constant communications with other state and federal regulatory agencies. 294 As a result, responses can be made expeditiously to inquiries regarding the "track records" of issuers, promoters, broker-dealers and salesmen. Securities lawyers, in order to protect their clients and themselves, frequently must rely on the wealth of information accumulated by state securities commissions in order to conduct "due diligence" investigations.'" Because many fraudulent schemes are directed at one particular state or region of the country, 29 " state administrators are able not only to monitor these schemes more closely than their federal counterpart, but also are able to warn potential investors by publicizing the fraudulent activity being perpetrated.'" By providing information that sometimes goes far beyond the prolix disclosures of prospectuses and offering memoranda, state securities commissions make a significant contribution to an informed marketplace.
The differences in regulatory scope, philosophy and function between the state and federal approaches demonstrate the minimal nature of the duplication at issue. To the extent duplication exists, it is more accurately described as an overlap -regulation that fills in the cracks where regulatory protection would not otherwise be provided.'" Con- Rev. 147, 155 (1978) . 292 Id. 299 Id . . 1 " Section 413 of the Uniform Securities Act requires the state administrator to maintain and make available to the public a register of all denial, suspension and revocation orders. 7A U.L. A. 689 (1978) .
See also The need for overlap in a dual system of securities regulation is illustrated cominously by the shifting t rends of regulatory intensity at. both levels due to the dynamics of federalism and the evolving regulatory atmosphere. In particular,• the new federal role recommended in the report prepared by President. Reagan's transition team 299 illustrates well the need for regulatory overlap. It demands it. Without the flexibility this overlap provides, a substantial degree of investor protection would be sacrificed. In other words, regulatory overlap prevents the very loss of investor confidence in securities markets which triggered federal intervention in the field fifty years ago.""" The need for regulatory overlap is clear given the available resources. The SEC's resources, as observed previously, have been reduced significantly in recent. years due to inflationary effects on its annual appropriations from Congress.'" In fact., the SEC will employ a smaller staff in 1984 than it did ten years ago. i"2 Moreover, it is highly unlikely that Congress would ever be willing to appropriate sufficient funds to the SEC to fulfill the regulatory role traditionally performed by the states. One SEC commissioner has stated that preemption of state blue sky laws, without a corresponding increase in federal resources, "would work to the detriment of the investor.""" The SEC, even under the dual system, "does not have the resources to assure proper regulation of all the participants in the burgeoning securities market."' Although state securities commissions are alsO funded insufficiently to do their respective jobs, they frequently are able to call on numerous state investigative and enforcement personnel for assistance.'`"' In addition, state resources have increased due to cooperation between the states through multistate enforcement efforts." One former state regulator has stated that "the states, on a 
B. Uniformity
The critics of state regulation claim that the blue sky laws, because they vary from state to state, place an undue burden on a securities industry which has become "inherently interstate in scope.' ' 3" In a federalist system, however, it is common for the states, under their police power, to regulate an infinite variety of matters in non-uniform ways, 309 State regulatory schemes differ significantly in such diverse business fields as insurance,' real estate' and public utilities.'" 2 These and other state regulated areas of commerce are conducted, like securities, through both intrastate and interstate transactions. 31 " Nevertheless, the absence of uniformity in securities regulation has become the battle cry of every critic of state blue sky laws.' 34 Uniformity in securities regulation is an issue related closely to the duplication issue.
It posits two questions. The first is whether each of the states should have different sets of regulations based on differing local needs. The second is whether the states should have sets of laws, which, collectively, are not identical to those portions of the federal regula- 
